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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate 
George F. Roth, deceased. 
George Roth, Petitioner and 
.A .. ppellant, 
vs 
Albert Roth, defendant and 
Respondent. 
Respondent's Brief 
Case No. 8040 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is only an Appeal by George Roth; Janie Roth 
does not appeal from the Judgment and Decree. 
We agree with appellant on his statement of facts 
up to and including that portion of page 4 which states 
that pleadings were joined and the trial was had before 
Honorable J. A. Hendricks at Logan, Utah, with the 
single exception that defendant had more than occupancy 
of the property in question, he had possession as admit-
ted in appellant's pleading (R 6). There is also a slight 
mistake in description of property but of course proper 
description was intended. In regard to George demand-
ing an accounting as stated· pp. 2 and 3 of appellant's 
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brief, it will be observed that it was notuntil_Albe:rt Roth 
had caused to b.e sent to George Roth and his wife, Janie, 
a quitclailn deed ( def. exhibit 2) for their signatureR 
that George Roth through his counsel sent Albert a let-
ter (def. exhibit 3) and among other things he wanted 
to know the appraised value of said real property in 
controversy. In reply to said letter Albert caused letter 
( def. exhibit 4) to be sent and which informs George Roth 
of the appraised value of the real property which was 
$1800.00 and in which he further recites the pay1nent of 
$400.00 leaving a balance of $500.00. 
As is mentioned in appellant's brief the said Emma 
Roth was the step-mother of Albert and George Roth, 
but George Roth testified more extensively than is in-
diciated in appellant's brief and without this added 
testimony a misunderstanding might be had of its im-
port. George testified that what he was to receive was 
fifty-fifty n1atter to be based upon the appraisal of his 
father's estate and that payment was not to be made 
until step-mother's death (R46). The real property was 
appraised at $1800.00 (R2,53). That there was talk of 
sale at time of father's death in 1935 is also admitted 
by George Roth (R45,46). George Roth further testi-
fied that his wife came to Providence and got $400.00 
from Albert; that he did not send his wife to get it 
(R47); that he authorized her to give a receipt for the 
money; that he (George) had not jointly made the re-
c.eipt out; that the signature of George Roth. on the in-
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strument def. exhibit (1) was his signature and that 
Albert Roth ~fay 27, 1949 is in his handwriting (R 48, 
49) Note the apparent contradiction of George's test-
imony) Albert Roth testified as follows in addition to 
what is given in appellants brief under statement of 
case. Albert Roth testified that after their father died 
("\vhich was in 1935) that George told him he didn't 
'vant the place and that Albert was to pay him his half; 
that he, Albert, could pay it as circun1stances permitted 
and that he could pay the balance at time of stepmothers 
death; that a couple of weeks prior to the giving of the 
receipt ( def. exhibit 1, admitted in evidence R. 54); 
that he told Janie Roth that he had some stock and ex-
pected enough out of it to pay for half of the property 
(R 52); that the real property was appraised at . 
$1800.00; that Janie came up and asked about the money; 
he got a cashiers check which he handed to her; she 
pulled out her receipt book and says ''George only made 
out a part of it, you fill out the balance of it.'' ''She 
signed her name and tore out the leaf of her book and 
gave it to me.''; he thought there was a carbon copy 
(R 53, 54); that in December 1951, Attorney Wight and 
George came to Providence and said that property had 
gone up and wanted more money; that he never said 
anything for he figured that settle1nent was to be had 
on the $1800.00 appraisal. "I asked Mr. Wight if the 
property had gone down, then I would have been stuck.'' 
He says "I don't know (R 55). Albert, further testify-
ing: ''I says, It looks to me like whether the property 
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had gone up or down, I am going to get stuck.'' -He 
~a~,~, "it looks that way". Appellant did not see fit 
to testify for himself on this. Albert put roof on house, 
hot water system, linoleum, fixed roof on barn in 1949-50 
after it caved in, painted house, put in lawn (R 57, 58) 
Some $700.00 worth as put by appellant in his brief (at 
pp. 14) 
CROSS OF ALBERT ROTH 
In addition to what appellant refers to as cross-
examination of Albert, Albert ·also testified as follows: 
Q. "You say that you and George entered into an 
agreement in 1935 ~'' 
A. "We took it over. We tried to get an appraisal 
of what we was going to do with the place. I just 
told him that we ought to have the property appraised 
to find out how much it was worth, before I was to buy 
his half''. 
Q. ''That was in November, was it.~'' A.''Yes, sir.'' 
Q. ''That was fifty-fifty~'' 
A. "Yes." 
Q. ''On a fifty-fifty basis, that was your understand-
ing." 
A. "That was my understanding." (R 60) 
Then, too, there is the very significant conversation 
between appellant and respondent at the time of step 
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mother's death in 1951 in which respondent said that 
he owed appellant more money on the place and that 
·-about the only thing I can think of about the property 
is to mortgage the property" and pay it off. (R 61) 
Further testifying on cross : 
Q. ''There was a conversation I would like to clear 
up.'' 
A. "Your conversation, yes, you came up here and 
you say that you thought that you should have more 
money, that the price, the value of the property had gone 
up, and that I should pay more money" (R 62) It was 
further agreed that a complete settlement should be had 
at step-mother's death. (R 64) 
Afton Roth-witness for respondent. 
Afton ~oth testified that she had a talk with appel-
lant Roth and that he (appellant) told her ''you don't 
have to think that you have to give my wife money when-
ever she mentions it, or whenever she says that we need 
money". (R 66) This was about 2 weeks before Janie 
Roth actually got the money. (R 65) 
Janie Roth-Direct 
In addition to Janie Roth's testimony noted in ap-
pellant's brief Janie testified she gave. the cashiers 
check to her husban~ Q-e.orge ~oth who cashed. it. (R 73) 
On Cross Janie .Roth testified 
Janie Roth althpugh·· t_estifying on direct examina-
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ti.on that she didn't look at the receipt, ( def. exhibit 1) 
~ret on cross testified as follows : Q. ''Albert, or George 
wrote this, four hundred dollars, or Albert wrote that~" 
A. '"'Yes, sir." 
Q. ''Five hundred dollars balance, he wrote that~'' 
A. ''Yes, sir.'' 
Q. "You saw him write that didn't you~" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "This is Albert's writing on that - I mean 
George's, writing~" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. ''And George wrote that~'' 
A. "Yes." 
Q. ''And then, here, you say Janie Roth is not your 
signature ~ ' ' 
A. ''This is my writing here. This is not my '' R'' 
(R 74, 75) 
Albert Roth - recalled 
Albert Roth testified that Janie Roth had a receipt 
book when she came to Providence and that he saw her 
write her name on the_ receipt after he had completed 
the receipt. (R75,_ 7~) Albert further testified: "This 
prior arrangement that made out at ,the .gate when they 
were_ up the week before~· I told her that, at the gat_e, 
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I o'ved nine hundred dollar~, I would be 'villing to pay 
part of that, as n1uch as I could borrow that to help 
thein. I didn't have to n1ake the loan.'' 
ARGI.-~IENT 
Point 1. Appellant states under point ·number 1 
that ans,Yer and counterclaim fail to state facts upon 
'vhich relief can be granted. Respondent disagrees and 
believes that a mere reading of said. answer and counter-
claim 'vill show appellant in error. True, as appellant 
states, the agreement lay in parol, but is also bottomed 
by a very substantial payment of $400.00. · Improvements 
were, as stated by appellant at about $700.00 · (appel-
lant's bri-ef 14) but which improvements appellant calls 
"slight". On a $900.00 deal they seem to the appellant 
to be very substantial and which. respondent, Albert 
Roth, testified he would not have made unless he was 
going to have the place (R 58}.. There is no evidence, 
·whatsoever, that the improvements were to be treated 
as rent to ·Emma Roth. If appellant had had the slight-
·est belief that it was he would certainly have developed 
-it on trial as he was appraised of the claim of improve-
ments, part payment, and possession .by respondent in 
:the pleadings as taking the case out of the statute ·Of 
frauds and that statute had no application to the facts 
of this case. Though the improvements were made prior 
to the ·May 27, 1949, the time the court found the sale 
··was actually made, they were certainly made after there 
was an agreement to sell in 1935. Appelhint concedes 
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that substantial improvements is evidence of reliance 
upon a contract so we will quote no authority. 
There is another argument that we shall urge at 
the end of our arguments to the points set out in ap-
pellant's brief which is common argument against all 
points set forth by appellant. 
Point 2. 
Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the Findings. In this, too, we disagree. At the 
time of the father's death in 1935 appellant said he did 
not want the place and Albert said he would take it. 
Payment was to be made after the death of the step-
mother (R 46, 51). As to the price, that was determined 
by the appraisal of the property (real) which was 
$1800.00 (R 2, 5, 53). George was to be paid % of the 
appraisal and according to his own testimony it was to 
be a "fifty-fifty proposition" (R46) And, Albert test-
ifying said that in his talk with George at the time of 
his father's death that he was to pay appellant "his 
half". To which appellant said, "that was agreeable 
to him". (R51) At the time of step-mother's death in 
May of 1951 in a talk with appellant and in answer to 
the Court, respondent testified as to that talk as follows: 
''I suppose we will. have to· make a settlement'' I says 
''I don't want to sell my. cow or what I have got, there 
would· not be enough_ .out of it ~o pay you." ·-I says,, 
"I will have to mortgage the prop·erty and get _it from 
the bank.'' ''I told h~~ l cquld get th~ ~money from the 
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Inortgage and send it to him." (R 55) Later in Decem-
ber of 19;)1, Attorney Wight and respondent came up 
and "Tanted more money, saying the property had gone 
up. That remark drew from the respondent that- though 
the property went up or down he was to ''get stuck.'' 
\Vight ans,vering sys, "it looks that way." (R54, 55, 
56). 
It is most peculiar that appellant denies sending his 
wife to get any money from Albert and at the same time 
says that he authorized her to give a receipt for. the 
money received; that it was his signature on the receipt; 
that "Albert Roth, May 27, 1949," was his hand writing; 
that the name of Janie Roth on the receipt looked like 
his wife's hand writing (R48, 49). That appellant au-
thorized his wife to obtain the money there can be no 
doubt and that the money was paid for the property 
in question is not even open to reasonable dispute. Why 
else would the receipt read ''Received of Albert Roth, 
four hundred and no/100 Dollars, $500.00 balance due''. 
That is not the language of a party obtaining a loan as 
appellant would now have this Court believe, but is the 
language of one getting payment and still having money 
coming which by the way respondent was not even obi-
gated to pay any part according to an understanding 
of the parties in 1935 as the step-mother was not then 
deceased. Appellant points to the alleged fact that no 
conversation in regards to the property had taken place 
from 1935 to 1951, between appellant and respondent. 
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It will be noticed, however, that respondent's wife, Afton 
Roth, testified that about 2 weeks before respondent gave 
the $400.00 to appellant's wife that she had a talk with 
appellant and in which he said: "You don't have to think 
that you have to give my wife money whenever she men-
tions it, or whenever she says we ned money.'' (R 66) 
Can it be doubted that this bit of advice given to respon-
dent's wife by appellant had any reference to anything 
but payment for the property in question and on an 
agreement well understood by appellant and his wife~ 
\Ve believe not. Appellant did not see fit to take the 
stand in his own behalf to deny or qualify this or say 
that this had reference to a loan and -~ot the all~ged 
sale of the property. Then, too, if both appellant and 
respondent are to be believed as to ~n understanding in 
1935 that respondent was to have ~he place further co~­
~ersation was uncalled for as to payment until the d_eath 
of Emma Roth. 
Another -matter taken up by appellant was th~t the~e 
was no conversation as between appellant's. w1fe and 
respondent con-cerning _the sale of the.-property in ques..-
tion. . This is not so fo-r- two ~weeks _before the receipt 
was given (May 27, 1~51) appellant and his wife visit~d 
respondent in Providenc~ where Janie inf-orme~ r~spond­
ent that George was_ in ne,ed of money as he had-:to have 
,mdical attenti()n and it was t~king-lot~ of mo~ey.and_if 
he could help them out. That he told he;r that he -~~d 
bu,ilding ~nd loan st()ck ~nq_''exp~cted enough to ~a~e 
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up to pay of£ this obligation to pay for half of the prop-
erty". (R 52) Then, too, when Janie gave Albert the 
reecipt introduced (Def. exhibit 1) which said in part 
"balance due $500.00" it is hard to believe that. she did 
not know and agree to with the contract as alleged and 
proved by respondent. Here we then have an agreement 
certain and specific in its terms and meets every require-
ment as laid down in Hargraves v. Burten, 59 Utah 575, 
206 P. 262 for specific performance. S9 we maintain 
that the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of 
the Court. 
Point 3. 
Appellant complains that the ''Findings and Con-
clusio-ns are insufficient to' suppott the Decree.'' 
We believe that both Findings and Conclusions sup-
port the Decree of the Court. A mere reading of para-
graphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Findings taken with the balance 
of the- said Findings sufficiently support said Decree. 
Paragraph 5 states that ''That on .l\tfay 27, 1949, an oral 
agreement ·\Vas entered into between A~ bert Roth, as 
buyer and George Roth and his wife~, J ani~ Roth, as 
sellers, .whereby the sellers were to receive the sum of 
$900.00 for their undivided one-half interest. in the a-
foresaid described real estate, and. the buyer agreed to 
pay $900.00, and paid $400.00 to the sellers and received 
a written receipt stating that there was_ a balance due of 
$500.00''. In paragraph. No. 1 the property is describ~d 
and to which paragraph 5 refers (R24, 25, 26). So there 
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was a substantial payment in pursuance of the agree-
Inent alleged by respondent. As to the argument of ap-
pellant that Findings do not find that respondent took 
possession it seems sufficient to say that the Court 
found that upon the death of Emma J. Roth in May, 
1951, the said real property ''reverted to Albert Roth''. 
Certainly this is a finding that in as much that posses-
sion ceased in Emma J .Roth, it commenced and was 
in respondent. Then too, in appellant's Statement of 
case he conceded that Albert Roth occupied the premises 
to the present time. (Def. Brief 2) Also in his plead-
ings he concedes that respondent has had possession 
since the death of Emma Roth on the 30th day of May, 
1951 (R 6) Respondent denies appellant made any off 
the record offer for the property. 
Point 4. 
Appellant contends_ that ''the court should have ap-
plied Appellant's plea of the Statute of Frauds-Sec-
tion 33-5-2 Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
It is our contention that the Statute of Frauds has 
no application to the facts in this matter. It is true 
that the contract of sale between the parties lies in parol 
bu there there was a payment of $400.00 to George Roth 
and his wife on the sale followed by exclusive posses-
sion which is sufficient (Marfield v. West 6 Ut. 327, 23 
P. 754; Allen v. Allen 30 Ut. 104, 166 P. 1169) For 
the plaintiff to claim that it was a loan does not square 
with the receipt given which states that there was a bal-
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ance due of $500.00. If it was a loan, certainly the 
phrase "balance due $500.00" would not appear on the 
receipt. Then too, George Roth, the petitioner in this 
n1atter testified that it was a sale as did Albert Roth. 
~;\lso the wife of Albert Roth testified that sometime 
before the $400.00 was paid George Roth told her that 
they need not pay merely because his wife Janie asked 
for it. This is not the language of a party seeking a 
loan when viewed in the light of previous conversation 
running back as far as the death of the father in 1935 
and which necessarily must be taken into consideration 
as to a culmination of sale in 1949 when reecipt was 
given. So it is our contention that it was part pay-
ment on the place in question and a very susbstantial 
one when we consider the full price was $900.00 or one 
half of the appraised value of the father's property. 
The receipt shows conclusively what the full price was 
and in connection with this we may say that the testi-
mony given by Janie Roth that she did not see the re-
ceipt after Albert had written the amount paid and that 
due is not tenable as is the further testimony of hers 
that the name Janie Roth appearing on the receipt 
was not her signature. Not only did her husband testify 
as to his own writing and signature appearing thereon 
but he as well as Albert Roth testified that her name 
appearing thereon was her signature as has heretofore 
been pointed out .. 
Some mention is made in petitioner's brief that the 
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terms were too indefinite to constitute a contract or sale 
and thus not susceptible for a decree of specific per~ 
for1nance. We hardly see how they could be more de-
finite as there was a complete understanding ·between 
the parties as to the property involved including pay-
ment. Certainly no one will contend that because the 
exact date or dates when the agreement was made could 
not be stated that that would make it void or vo~dable. 
Appellant speaks of the contract not being equit-
able. The evidence shows, however, that Albert was 
buying one half of the remainder of said property, but 
he agreed to pay $900.00 which obviously was more than 
the remainder was worth because possession would be 
in the mother until her death unless she turned it over 
to Albert which would be no concern to petitioner. It 
will be recalled that Albert was to pay one-=half of the 
appraised value of the property. It will be further. re-
called that after the pleadings were filed in this matter 
by both parties the petitioner's counsel, Wight, and pe-
titioner call on Albert and in the course of the con-
versation Attorney Wight said that the property had 
gone up since the agreement and therefore more money 
should be paid. In reply to that Albert asked him. in 
the presence of petitioner what if the property had gone 
down and Wight said in effect that that would ·be too 
bad for Albert. 
Something __ also .. lS .. said_. In petitioner's _ brief_ that 
George's -wife, Janie, was. not ware of the .deal. : ·.This 
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is indeed a peculiar staten1ent when both she and her 
husband came up to Logan about 2 weeks before the 
$400.00 was paid and asked about payment. Albert's 
rejoinder to this request '""as that he would have to get 
the n1oney fron1 the Logan Building and Loan and that 
he 'vould send it down to them. After making such a 
statement he thought that he should have some sort of 
receipt and therefor decided to go down in person. 
Ho,Yever, before he could get around to it Janie came 
up and gave the receipt with its reading part '' $500.00 
balance due'' and received the $400.00. And to clain1 
now that she did not consent and agree to the sale 
1s unreasonable and unwarranted. 
After the death of the father in 1935 George offered 
his one-half interest in the remainder for what the ap-
praised value of the property would show. When Albert 
paid the $400.00 in 1949 the deal and sale was then 
certainly closed if it had not been before because of 
improvements made followed by payment and posses-
sion as when the mother died he assumed exclusive pos-
session of the same in pursuance to the sale with con-
sent of appellant. (R 61) This is sufficient to take 
the matter out of the statute and we cite in support 
thereof the following notes in Vol. 2 on pp. 649 Ut. Code 
Annotat~d, 1943, ''A parol partition between joint 
owners of real property, when carried out and followed 
by actual possession in severalty of the several parols, 
is valid and will be enforced notwithstanding the sta-
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tute of frauds. Allen v. Allen 50 Utah, 104, 166 ·p. 
1169. '' 
Petitioner quotes certain authorities in regards to 
the necessity of certainty of parol agreement. We con-
tend in addition to what we have already said that 
everything has been met as to certainty, etc., but in-
stead of particularizing in all matters referred to we 
cite this court and appellant to Volume 49 A.J. pp. 34, 
sec. 22 to 33 inclusive on this phase of the case and as 
to the inequities that is referred to I refer to same 
volume pp. 72 sec. 58 to 65 inclusive. The text con-
tained in said sections is a complete and full answer 
to petitioners contention but we particularize to an ex-
ample or two. If it can be said that the exact time is 
not stated as to when the balance owing should be paid 
(but it was at step-mother's death} it is implied that 
performance may be required within reasonable time. 
Pegg v. Olsen 31 Wyo. 96, 223 P 223, 136 A.L.R. 142 
Leaf v. Cod 41 Idaho 547, 240 P. 593. The same is true 
of interest when nothing is said as to the percent the 
legal rate will be presumed to :have. been intended 37 
A.L.R. 361. This is assuming that any interest at all 
was intended by parties which there was not in this 
case. If it can be said that appellant made ·a bad bar-
gain that is no reason for,the court to refuse:.specific 
performance. Am. Jur. Vohnne 49, sec. 60, 63,·64~:-r: But 
it was riot a bad ·bargairi as respondent was· to pay on~ 
haJf of· the appraised value of the p-roperty .whick. was 
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$1800.00 but \vhich ,v-as subject to a life estate in step-
mother. It \vonld seen1 that it was a very good bargain 
for appellant. 
As to the contention that Albert Roth has an 
adequate remedy at law American Jurisprudnce in same 
volume pp. 186 says ''that as a general rule, the court 
presumes that remedy at law is inadequate in case of 
contract to convey land.'' We showed that Albert not 
only paid the $400.00 but put expensive improvements 
on the p·roperty in question because of his deal with 
petitioner and which justified him in so doing and that 
the property means much to him because it had been 
his home. It is a unique piece of property to him which 
cannot be compensated for in damages or merely the 
payment of money. 
It is an elementary matter of law that through 
the trial court bottoms its judgment erroneously yet it 
will be sustained if the lower court could have bottomed 
its judgment on proper grounds. (Corpus Juris Vol. 4 
pp. 1132 Section 3125) 
Point 5. 
It is further contended by appellant that the court 
improperly changed its decision after court adjourned 
and this is assigned as an error. Of course this is not 
error nor is it unfair to anyone. The judge after fur-
ther reflection upon the case decided that he was in error 
and modified his former decision. 
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Respondent's Statement of Additional Points 
Point 1. The Notice of Appeal is limited and bars 
consideration of points raised by appellant. 
Point 2. No point is made by appellant of the lower 
courts denial of a new trial to appellant and is there-
fore a waiver of grounds raised under motion for a 
new trial and a bar in consideration of points raised. 
Argument 
Point No. 1 
Attention is called to the form and contents of ap-
pellant's Notice of Appeal which besides stating court 
and matter reads thus: "Notice is hereby given that 
George Roth, petitioner and appellant named, herebY. 
appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
from that Judgment and Decree, by which George Roth 
was allowed only $962.50 for his portion of the Estate 
of George F. Roth, deceased entered in this action on 
the 6th day of November, 1952." From this language it 
seems to clearly appear that appellant only appeals 
from that part of decree and judgment ·which allows 
him only $962.50'' for his portion of the property· jri 
question. He does not appeal from the judgment and 
decree of· the lower court in ordering. he and his wife, 
Janie Roth, to depositing _a_ quitclaim. deed with . the 
Clerk of ·the Court of. :the property in question which 
the Clerk of the ·court_ is·· ordered to ·surrender tore~ 
spondent upon he de-positing with. the Clerk .. the: sum 
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·of $562.50 to be delivered to appellant for the said 
property. (The respondent had already paid $400.00 
as heretofore noted.) 
Having thus li1nited himself can he now be heard 
on any other or all of his state1nent of points~ We think 
not. \V-ould he not now be confined to a single point 
'(if he had 1nade such a point) under his Notice of Ap-
peal to the alleged insufficiency of the money awarded 
him in the Decree and Judgment~ In other words, his 
Notice of Appeal finds no ·fault with any other part 
of the Judgment and Decree. He only excepts to the 
supposed insufficiency of the amount allowed him and 
no point is made of this alleged insufficiency under 
his statement of points. It is stated in volume 3 Am. 
J ur. pp. 363, sec, 822 that : ' 'Where the appeal is from 
only a part of a decree, that portion not appealed from 
cannot be reviewed'', citing cases. It would therefore 
seem that the question is jurisdictional and if that be 
so there seems nothing for this court to do but to dis-
miss the appeal as to the points raised by appellant as 
to these points and that would seem to dispose of 
the case. 
Point 2. No point is made by appellant of the lower 
courts denial of a new trial to appellant and is there-
fore waiver of grounds raised under t~e motion for 
a new trial and a bar to the consideration of the points 
raised. 
It will be noted ~hat appell;:tnt made a motion for 
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a new trial on two grounds, to wit: (1) Insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the decision and the same is 
against law, (2) Error in law·. (R 30) It will be fur-
ther noted that a motion for a new trial was denied 
on the 7th day of May, 1953, (R 37) By failing to 
1nake a point of this denial it seems to us that it pre-
cludes a hearing on the points raised for it seems true to 
us that the points raised must necessarily come under 
or be premised on the grounds that were raised in the 
request for a new trial, and having failed to do so, if 
the same was not a mere oversight, seems to preclude 
consideration of the points by this court. For as point-
ed out in Bennett vs. Root Furniture Co., 176 Ind. 603, 
96 N. E. 708, the failure of appellant to urge in his 
brief error in overruling a motion for a new trial, waiv-
ed the determination of error in rulings on instructions 
and evidence required to be raised by such a motion. 
To the same effect i~ G~en County vs. Lattas Creek 
j4_/V._I; . t.. 3 '3 
Company, (Ind A.) which says 1n effect that an assign-
ment of error to the overruling of a motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that the findings of the court are 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and that the decis-:-
ion of the court is contrary to the law, is waived, where 
the motion is not set out in appellant's brief and the 
evidence is not brought into the· transcript. Here we 
ha':e the eyidence it is true ~u·t no point of the fact of 
the denial of a new trial. 
.. 
Conclusion 
·:.:;. ·rn conclusion.: resp~~dent· says that a definite a-
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green1ent of sale 'vas made in May of 1949, when the 
receipt was given stating that there 'vas due the bal-
ance of $500.00, and 9n '""hich receipt appears the name 
fANlE 
of George Roth and Emma Roth his wife and followed 
by exclusive possession at the time of Emma Roth's 
death in l\Iay of 1951 'vith the consent of the Roths 
for at said time Albert Roth said to George Roth, "I 
guess I owe you some more money on this property.'' 
''I says, 'I don't know how much I could get, unless I 
sell n1y cow; I don't know whether I can get enough to 
pay for it.'' ''I says, 'about the only thing I can think 
of about the property is to mortgage the property.'' 
George did not take the stand on the matter to deny it 
and therefore from the language here used there must 
be read into it the consent of appellant that Albert 
have possession. But if it can be successfully argued 
that the sale did not take place at the time found by 
the court we urge that it took place in 1935 when the 
father died at which time appellant said he did not want 
it and respondent said he would take it and pay half of 
the appraisal of the same at the time of Emma Roth's 
death and which was agreed to by appellant as has 
heretofore been pointed out. This was followed by im-
provements as appellant admits totaling about ,$700.00 
and payment of $400.00 in 1949 and possession in 1951 
with the consent of appellant. As to the $400.00 which 
appellant urges was a loan in addition to what we have 
already said in that regard there 1nay be added that 
if a loan had been intended in 1949, appellant, we be-
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lieve would have sent up a note already signed by hhn, 
instead of a receipt which had his signature already upon 
it and which note would have stated when the alleged 
loan vv-as to be repaid. It must be further born in 
rnind that there is no testimony that appellant ever 
thought of repaying the now claimed purported loan. 
This Court has held upon numerous occasions that 
it will not disturb the findings of a lower cour~ if there 
is any evidence to substaintiate it's findings, conclus~ 
ions and judgment even though in such matters they 
differed with the opinion of this Court unless it could 
be further said that there was an abuse of discretion 
in the court below. 
In addition to what we have already said· in our 
Conclusion there is the further fact that appellant by 
liiniting his appeal and a further failure. of stating as 
·one of his points for reversal of judgment the denial 
of the court of his motion for a new trial seemingly 
bars the points made from being considered by thi~ 
Court. 
We respectfully urge therefore. that the ·Court 
should dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment 
and decree ·of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A_·. Sjostrom-
Attorney ·for Defendant 
arid Re-spondent· 
Perhaps we·_.- should. suggest ~here that appellant 
·has died since· this· appeal was taken. : · _ ·
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